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Kiblat a n d  t h e  M e d ia t ic  Je w
James T. Siegel
kiblat 1. direction of Mecca (at the time of prayer)
2. direction; aim; compass point, esp. one from which the wind
arises
berkiblat: directed toward . . . ;  e.g., politics directed toward the interests 
of international communism.
From W. J. S. Poerwadarminta, Kamus Umum 
Bahasa Indonesia (General Dictionary of 
Indonesian) (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1966)
Practically speaking, there are no Jews in Indonesia. Nor do Indonesians usually 
claim that there are. But it is now said that there is strong Jewish influence corrupting 
Islam, sometimes disguised as orthodox Islamic truth and producing political unrest. 
There has long been anti-Semitism in Indonesia, but the amount of anti-Semitic 
material increased greatly during the regime of President Suharto. The Protocols o f the 
Elders o f Zion have been republished several times, as well as much else in the way of 
anti-Semitic literature.* 2 Nor is it unusual to hear Jews referred to as the cause of 
Indonesia's present economic crisis.
1 1 want to thank Anne Berger and Michael Meekeer as well as the members of the conference convened 
by Samuel Weber and Hent de Vries for their comments on this paper. In particular I am strongly 
indebted to Sam Weber for remarks which enabled me to rethink the issues that follow.
2 Martin van Bruinessen, "Yahudi sebagai Simbol Dalam Wacana Pemikiran Islam Indonesia Masa Kini" 
("Jew as Symbol in the Discourse of Indonesian Islamic Thinking at the Present Time"), in Spiritualitas 
Baru: Agama dan Aspirasi Rakyat (New Spirituality: Religion and the People's Aspirations), ed. Y. B. 
Mangunwijaya, et al. (Yogyakarta: Institut Dian/Interfidei, 1994), pp. 253-268. Van Bruinessen points out 
that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion were not republished in Indonesia from European sources but from 
Arabic. He traces the tendency to blame Jews for conspiracy in Indonesia not to Europe but to Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Ibid., pp. 254-255. He notes four editions of the Protocols in Indonesian, the 
earliest of which was published in 1982.
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In Europe and America Jews are thought to be knowable by their names. But in 
my experience, even Indonesians who have spent long periods in America or Europe 
often do not recognize "Cohen" or "Siegel" as indicators of Jewish origins. Nor do 
faces provide a clue. I was told several times by Indonesians, for instance, that my 
nose, long and pointed particularly by Indonesian standards, was admirable. It was 
admired in particular because it resembled the noses of Arabs. A Jew arriving in 
Indonesia, then, is likely to go unrecognized unless he says he is Jewish. But even this 
is not definitive. Once in Sumatra I told some Muslim friends I was of Jewish origin. 
They offered to take me to a coreligionist. Arriving at a house I saw through the 
window a large orthodox cross. The religious identity of the Jew, if this anecdotal 
evidence is worth anything, merges into that of the Christian, while the face of the Jew 
dissolves into the face of the Arab, the latter admired, the former feared. A Jew, even 
when he is present in the country, is without a face or an identity of his own. Even as 
he announces himself to Indonesians within Indonesia he seems to disappear.
Translating Allah
It seems useful to look at some examples of current anti-Semitic usage. The first of 
these was stimulated by a proposal for a new foundation for tolerance between 
religions. Nurcholish Madjid had been the leader of the Indonesian Muslim Students 
Association (HMI) during a critical moment in the establishment of the New Order, the 
term Suharto gave to his regime to distinguish it from that of Indonesia's first 
president, Sukarno. Nurcholish is well known amongst the figures who speak for 
Islam on the Indonesian national stage. In December 1992, he gave a talk about 
tolerance which aroused a furor amongst many Muslims and led to his being called a 
Zionist agent and a member of the International Jewish Conspiracy.3
Nurcholish provoked his audience in the first place by claiming that religion 
(iagama) was a danger. It stimulated intolerance and violence. He had recently returned 
from America, and he relied on the self-designated "futurologists" of the moment,
Media Dakwah, a journal which I shall discuss shortly, published tracts attributed to Benjamin Franklin 
and Martin Luther King warning against the danger of Jews. It quotes Napoleon saying, "The Jews are the 
Master robbers of the modem age. The evil of Jews does not stem from individual but from the 
fundamental nature of this people" (speech to the Council of State, April 30 and May 7,1806), p. 53. (Media 
Dakwah, Research Team, "Fakta dan Data Untuk William Liddle" [August, 1993]) It also published 
translations of Roger Garaudy in the issues of March 1986, May 1986, and July 1986. For a commentary on 
Garaudy as seen by a certain Indonesian Muslim opinion, see Daud Rasyid, "Geraudi [sic] Vs. Sindikat 
Zionisme" ("Geraudis versus the Zionist Synidicat"), Media Dakwah, June 1997, pp. 17-18. Garaudy was 
frequently quoted also by Nurcholish Madjid.
Following conventional English usage I use "anti-Semitic" to mean "anti-Jewish."
3 A description of the institutional background of this talk can be found in Douglas Ramage, Politics in 
Indonesia (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 75-122. See also Robert W. Hefner, "Islamization 
and Democratization in Indonesia," in Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Renewal in Muslim 
Southeast Asia, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), pp. 75-129. Hefner 
speaks explicitly of Nurcholish Madjid and describes the distribution of Islamic leadership, but he 
minimizes that leadership's complicated relations with the Indonesian military and makes no mention of 
their virulent anticommunism which renders, as we will see, the extension of tolerance quite limited. It is 
hard to find a Muslim leader of national stature who openly opposed the rule of General Suharto until the 
last years of his regime. Nurcholish Madjid was not an exception. His efforts rather, as Hefner says, were 
to gain influence with the regime.
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people such as Alvin Toffler, to warn against certain dangers. Religion as he saw it 
needed to be saved from itself. He repeated something he had said twenty years 
earlier, when he had recently returned to Indonesia after studying in the United States 
at the University of Chicago. At that moment he coined a slogan, "Islam, Yes; Partai 
Islam, No" (Islam, Yes; Islamic Party, No). In sum, the problem with religion was its 
organized element. The religious spirit was valuable, but the institutionalization of 
religion provoked conflict and other difficulties. In the contemporary scene, in 1992, he 
thought the danger was cults. Cults—meaning the bands of sometimes violent devout 
then a concern in America—were the result of a perverted religious impulse. They 
were an effect of the "alienation" (a term he borrowed from Eric Fromm) caused by 
industrial society. They produced intolerance and even violence. Cults, said 
Nurcholish, represent the flight of the spiritual, for the spiritual has been driven out of 
industrial society by its characteristic confusion and loneliness. Organized religion 
cannot assuage this condition.
No one, Nurcholish added, claims that cults exist in Indonesia. Rather Nurcholish 
feared that, given the nature of religion and given also Indonesian social conditions, 
cults could arise:
But in Indonesia up till now, precisely the uneven distribution [of wealth] and 
inequality are characteristic; this emerges clearly in the distribution of 
information, opinion, and opportunity. Thus the crisis [krisis] here would be in 
fact much worse than in America, were it not for other factors which work to 
contain it. This crisis can take different forms of expression. One among them 
which can threaten and at the very least disturb stability [stabilitas] and national 
security. In other forms, it can be the emergence of cults and fundamentalism.4
There could be cults. They would arise just at the point where another danger 
threatened. When he speaks of threats and disturbances here, Nurcholish echoes 
conventional phrases employed by the New Order, which repeatedly warned the 
nation about dangers to "stability and national security." The New Order's "danger" 
referred to the menace of resurgent communism after its defeat, and after the massacre 
of hundreds of thousands of those accused of being communists in 1965-66. The 
danger arises from the maldistribution of opportunity and particularly of income in 
Indonesia that has come with the incursions of the international market. Nurcholish 
here expresses a distrust of destabilizing influences that he shares with his Islamic 
opponents, as we shall see. This opinion grows out of a warning spread by the 
government, the warning that both the government itself and the Indonesian public 
must be forever on guard against the attempted return of communists to power. Those 
who broadcast this warning point to the fact that in 1948, during the revolution, 
communists fought the forces of Sukarno. Despite their defeat, the Communist Party 
subsequently regained its position, reclaiming power to such an extent that in 1965 
many expected them to win control of the government through elections. It was just at 
this moment that communists were massacred. Now, it is feared, communists will 
emerge again.
4 Nurcholish Madjid, "Beberapa Renungan tentang kehidupan Keagamaan di Indonesia untuk-Generasi 
Mendatang." Nurcholish's talk and responses to it were republished by his opponents. See H. Lukman 
Hakiem, ed., Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan: Debat Besar'Pembaruan Islam' (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Studi Informasi Pembangunan, 1995), p. 47.
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Nurcholish speaks of the danger of cults rather than the danger of communism as a 
way of introducing his criticism of religion. Cults, in his view, are a stunted form of 
religion. One must open religion up; he proposed making it as inclusive as possible. 
He suggested a way for Muslims to accept the religious life of others. The Koran 
recognizes two other people of the book, Jews and Christians, to whom prophets 
appeared bearing the word of God. Mohammed is the seal of prophecy, the bearer of 
the perfected message. But Muslim men are allowed to marry Jewish and Christian 
women in acknowledgment of the line of prophecy common to their religions. In the 
interest of inclusion and of the spirit of religion, Nurcholish wants to show that the 
God of the Muslims is also the God of others. It is in the first place a question of the 
name of God.
Because "Tuhan" [the Indonesian word for "God"] and "Tuhan" can have 
different meanings. As an example, the "Allah" of Arabs before Islam differed 
from the "Allah" of Islam. Among other things, the "Allah" of the Arabs had 
children and associates [in English] who were all "served" with offerings and 
prostration by humans. While the "Allah" of Islam has the sense of God who is 
the only God, who is pure; according to Max Weber it is "pure monotheism"— 
strict monotheism [in English] as is cogently stated in the Koran, the well-known 
Surat A1 Iklhash.5
The name of God confuses. Nurcholish claims that the name is not relevant. "Allah" 
once meant not the monotheistic god of Islam, but a god of the polytheistic tribes 
before the foundation of Islam. What is important is that there is a single source of 
truth regardless of the name given it.
Everything that is true comes from the same source, that is Allah, the Truest [al- 
haqq]. And all prophets and apostles [rasul] bring the same message. The 
difference is only in the form of the response depending on the time and place of 
the apostle. Thus there are no differences of principle . . .  6
It is a question of identifying "the same source." And that is only in part a question of 
prophets and apostles. Thus it is not only Christians and Jews to whom divine message 
was brought. It is also Buddhists and Hindus and others. For those who have iman 
—faith—there are no great differences. Nurcholish follows an Arabic interpretation 
which gives Muslims the right to marry not only Jews and Christians—people of the 
book—but Chinese and Japanese and others because "they too have holy books which 
contain the basis of Tauhid [unicity] of God who is uniquely One."7
The names of God can be confusing. The important thing is to understand that one 
cannot know God in his uniqueness, his lack of duplication. To try and do so is to fall 
into the error known in Indonesian as berhala, which means to picture god, to create an 
image of him, and perhaps a material image. This for Nurcholish is the Muslim 
equivalent of alienation. Man worships what he creates; this means that man no longer 
controls his own productions; they control him. This he calls alienasi as he 
Indonesianizes the word "alienation" that he borrows from Eric Fromm.
5 Ibid., p. 51.
6 Ibid., p. 55.
7 Ibid., p. 59.
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Nurcholish Madjid had some defenders. They formed, in fact, one group of Muslim 
intellectuals on the Indonesian scene. It is his opponents, however, about whom I want 
to speak. They were numerous, but for the most part the arguments they put forward 
to challenge Nurcholish coincided. One assertion was that Nurcholish, in accepting 
that religion had undesirable effects and citing Westerners who made the same claim, 
no longer spoke from Islamic suppositions. According to Drs. Nabhan Husein,
It meant that he put in place a principle of use to measure a truth. This is the 
same as putting religion in the position of a tool [instrumen] subordinate to the 
criteria of the society concerned. When the society is flooded by change, a 
religion [Nurcholish thinks] has to be reexamined. And so on through the ages. A 
foundation of thinking of this sort might be compatible with certain religions but 
not with the Muslim religion.8
Such thinking, according to Lukman Hakiem, was based on a faulty understanding of 
the unknowability of God. Allah cannot be known, but He can be experienced. The 
result of working through contradictions, as he says Nurcholish does, by a method 
Lukman Hakiem labels Hegelian, is that it leads those who are naive into doubt, 
philosophy, and secularism. He claimed that Nurcholish's misunderstanding is based 
on his inadequate translation from Arabic.
Another critic, HM Hasballah Thaib, MA, warned, as did many others, of the 
danger of raising doubts through the use of inappropriate methods for the study of 
Islam, particularly secular ones.
Many people are already made nervous about their faith when la ilah ilallah [the 
first phrase of the confession of faith] is analyzed to mean "There is no god 
[tuhan with a small't'] except God [Tuhan with a capital'T']." Not to mention 
saying that "God never named himself Allah; only humans did that."9
Hasballah goes on to criticize Nurcholish for using Cartesian methods:
Imagine if someone who believed in Islam wanted to look for the truth. Would he 
have to leave Islam first? What would be the result? He would clearly be an 
apostate. In this way we see that scientific research [in English and italics] raises 
real danger when it is used in the area of faith.10
He concludes by finding fault with Nurcholish's translations of the surat A1 Imran and 
other parts of the Koran:
In his piece, NM frequently plays with Arabic words which have multiple 
meanings to the point where changing the meaning just a trifle can deceive the 
Muslim community, especially those who do not really understand the language 
of the Koran.11
8 Drs. Nabhan Husein, "Membedah Pemikiran Nurcholish Madjid/' in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan 
Keagamaan, pp. 144-173,160. Most of the articles in this collection were originally published in Media 
Dakwah in April, May, and June 1993.
9 HM Hasballah Thaib, "Mengkaji Gagasan Nurcholish," in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan, pp. 
112-123, originally given as a talk in Medan on July 27,1993.
10 Ibid., p. 114.
11 Ibid., p. 118.
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If Nurcholish is at fault, so too are Westerners who study Islam, usually referred to 
in these writings as "orientalists." Hasballah Thaib enumerated their faults. Like 
Nurcholish:
a. They are not willing to accept the truth of Islam.
b. They have an insufficient grasp of Arabic.
c. They do not understand Islamic law.
d. They look at Islam through Jewish or Christian lenses.12
Another critic explained why it is that orientalists are so influential:
After the West felt itself defeated in its attempt to control the Islamic community 
through political imperialism, the West struck out on another path. Among other 
things, they launched an attack from "within." For that they made an analysis of 
Islam in order to find its weaknesses (according to their assumptions). Then they 
disseminated this widely within their own areas and in the midst of the Muslim 
community itself in order to shake the faith of the Muslim community in its 
religion.13
This writer pointed out that various Muslims who studied in the West have exposed 
their strategy. The term "orientalists" lacked the specificity it has in Said's famous 
book, and, in fact, has little to do with Said's notion of scholars of the Middle Eastern 
tradition. In the works of these writers, only occasionally were orientalists named, and 
even then the line of connection between a particular scholar and his influence on 
particular Muslims, or, for that matter, the ideas of particular orientalists, went 
unmentioned. "Orientalists" as a term used by these authors was vague. Western 
scholars of Islam such as Jacques Berque, who are known to be defenders of Islam, 
went unmentioned. Vagueness of reference did not prevent the term from being 
consistently pejorative.
Several critics leveled the charge of orientalist influence against Nurcholish. A 
couple of them charged that he did not acknowledge his sources. Were he to do so, 
said Abu Ridho, it would mean acknowledging that many Muslim scholars who were 
students of Western orientalists are still under the control of their teachers. One has to 
understand that
the students of orientalists are their tools, scattered throughout every Muslim 
country, and continuously held in control by force of these orientalists.14
Misquotation and mistranslation often were said to be results of the influence of 
orientalists. Daud Rasyid, MA, pointed out that Muslims in their study of the Koran
12 Ibid., p. 119. Hasballah lists the factors which cause a Muslim to be influenced by the understandings of 
orientalists: 1. They do not understand the legacy (Legaci) or the true heritage of Islam and do not look at 
the true sources of authentic Islam; 2. They are deceived by scientific research (Cartesian theory) used in the 
area of faith; 3. They want to think freely rather than through religious interpretation (taqlid); 4. They are 
influenced by desire. Ibid., p. 119.
13 Daud Rasyid, "Meluruskan Akidah, Menangkal Mu'tazilah," in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan 
Keagamaan, p. 240. (Originally published in Media Dakwah, June 1993).
14 Abu Ridho, "Hikmah Lain dari Polemik Itu" in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan, pp. 208; 195- 
213. (Originally published in Media Dakwah, April 1993).
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and Hadiths have a certain method. They follow the etymology of Arabic words in 
order to be precise about their meanings, whereas Nurcholish does not.
Rasyid claims further that:
Those who are not disgusted by the contents of the thought launched at them 
will be stunned by the feverish use of foreign terms and the philosophical 
delivery.15
They "will be stunned and accept the ideas."
It is in this context that anti-Semitism arises. Daud Rasyid points out that 
Nurcholish is not the first to return from abroad with shocking ideas. There have been 
others. And there have been secularists of this sort in the Arab world as well. One of 
these is the Egyptian Thaha Husein, who claimed, Daud Rasyid says, that Mohammed, 
rather than receiving the Koran from God, wrote it himself. Thaha Husein, he says, 
claims that there is important Jewish influence on the Koran. He made these assertions 
"following the suggestions of his teacher, Durkheim of the Sorbonne University in 
France, who was the director of his doctoral thesis."16
Daud Rasyid repeats the charge of orientalism. He quotes Prof. Dr. Ismail Raji al- 
Faruqi from Temple University in Philadelphia, whom he claims "fell directly into the 
clutches of Jewish [Yahudi] Zionists in the study of Islam, from the giving of 
scholarships and professorships, and who was murdered by Zionist agents and who 
advised Muslims not to study Islam in the West." The problem, Faruqi explained, was 
that America "was accustomed to taking in exiled intellectuals who went against the 
mainstream in Muslim countries and who were later given positions in the US as 
university professors."17 Rasyid concludes that Western orientalists do not use 
scientific methodology which would insist on objectivity (obyektif) and an honest 
approach to Islam.
Returning to Nurcholish, he says that Nurcholish has mistranslated important 
words and has not followed the etymological methods that pertain in the study of the 
Koran and Hadiths. The results could be serious if, for instance, one translated in such 
way that it was no longer necessary to fast. Rasyid notes the declaration of Allah that 
exposes the tricks (trik-trik) of the Jews and of those who study Islam with the Jews, 
who twist the lines of Allah with devious turns of the tongue and stunning 
philosophical statements so that people will accept them as the truth. Maybe this is 
Nurcholish's aim so that everyone will think that the duties contained in the syari'ah 
are unimportant and it is no longer necessary to carry them out.18
15 Daud Rasyid, MA, "Kesesatan Dikemas dengan Gaya Ilmiah" (Deviation Put Right Through 
Knowledge), in Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan, p. 93. Originally given as an address on 
December 13,1992 in the mosque of TIM where Nurcholish gave his talk.
16 Ibid., p. 94.
17 Ibid., p. 95.
18 The Koranic verse he alludes to reads:
Some of the Jews pervert words from their meanings 
saying, "We have heard and we disobey" 
and "Hear, and be thou not given to hear"
and "Observe us," twisting with their tongues and traducing religion.
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He goes on to criticize Nurcholish for his claim that the designated "people of the 
book" whose women Muslims can marry include not only Jews and Christians but also 
Buddhists, Hindus, and others. This conclusion, he says, is the result of another of 
Nurcholish's mistranslations. Here is Rasyid's conclusion:
Finally, how difficult it is to [have to] say that Nurcholish forces himself to be 
arrogant toward Islam but he does not have the capacity [modal] for it. It is even 
harder to say that Nurcholish who claims to be rendering a service to Islam in 
Indonesia in fact actually damages Islamic thinking. The most difficult thing to 
say is that Nurcholish is a Zionist agent who ruins Islam from within.19
Daud Rasyid assimilates Nurcholish to others who have returned from study 
abroad. Lukman Hakiem blames Nurcholish for having studied at Chicago at length. 
"It was at Chicago that Nurcholish made the acquaintance of Prof. Leonard Binder, a 
fanatical Jew who proposed to this Indonesian Muslim intellectual the title Doctor 
provided he deny the role of the Muslim community in Indonesian life in the past and 
the future."20
Certain critics charged that Nurcholish spoke as a secularist. But secularism in their 
estimation merely delivered Nurcholish into the hands of Jews. If we assume that the 
secular, by contrast to the sacred, is open to argument, then a close examination of the 
criticisms leveled against Nurcholish show us that his critics do not really locate him in 
a "secular" tradition, but in an alien, blasphemous "sacred" tradition, a system of 
falsified faith. It may be that he is open to argument within the limits of Cartesianism, 
but he is outside the possibility of argument with genuine Muslims, oriented as they 
are to the sacred word and understanding it according to prescribed principles. 
Nurcholish is not merely weak in his command of sacred Arabic, they say. His 
weakness is itself a sign that he translates the sacred books by other principles, those of 
orientalists. He is relocated or reoriented elsewhere, toward another sacred, in the 
sense of another foundation of translation and method of thinking, though of course 
only a secularist could speak of "another sacred." Nurcholish's deviation from kiblat 
opens onto the secular; the secular is another kiblat, another set of principles that make 
it impossible for him to exchange views with those who think in genuinely Islamic 
terms. At the same time he continues to communicate with those who are unaware of 
what informs his thinking. He can only corrupt belief, according to this view.
If they had said, "We have heard and obey"
and "Hear" and "Regard us," it would have been
better for them, and more upright; but God has
cursed them for their unbelief, so they believe not except a few.
A. J. Arberry, trans., The Koran Interpreted, vol. 1 (New York: Collier Books, 1955), p. 107 (Surah IV, 
"Women").
19 D. Rasyid, MA, "Kesesatan Dikemas dengan Gaya Ilmiah," p. 105.
20 Lukman Hakiem, "Nabi Gagal Menjalankan Missinya? Meuguji pemikiran Nurcholish" ("Was the 
Prophet defeated in Carrying Out his Mission?: Analysing the thought of Nurcholish") Media Dakwah, 
December 1992, p. 4. Nurcholish is reported to have said later that Leonard Binder was never in a position 
to make such an offer. R. William Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political 
Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia," in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in 
Indonesian Political Thought, ed. Mark Woodward (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), p. 353, 
footnote 18.
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Some writers in the monthly magazine Media Dakwah, where much of the criticism 
of Nurcholish was published, no longer consider Nurcholish to be a Muslim, but no 
one claims he is a Jew.21 According to his critics, Nurcholish is the agent, more often 
than not unwitting, of orientalists. He is in their power, unreachable by argument. In 
that sense, too, Nurcholish's understanding of the Koran is a mistranslation only from 
one point of view. The Jews who have, in the understanding of Nurcholish's critics, 
mistranslated the Koran have done so willfully. Their intentions, though nefarious, are 
fully transmitted in Nurcholish's discourse. The Koran may be mistranslated, but the 
words of Jewish orientalists are not. Generations after their studies were made, their 
work shows up intact without any slippage in translation from English or French or 
German into Arabic and from there into Indonesian. Unwitting Indonesian Muslims, 
duped by these studies, repeat the intentions of Jews who lived generations before on 
different continents.
There is no mistranslation at all. On the contrary there is a path of translation that 
is always accurate, preserving the inimical intentions at its origin. These bad intentions 
differ from those one encounters in daily life. One can reply to or even correct threats 
in daily life. But there can be no exchange of views with those of another orientation. 
They are under the control of others far away in time and place. Nurcholish at best 
could repent rather than modify his opinions. For their part, his critics could be 
influenced by him only at the cost of accepting something which would remain 
^compatible with everything else they think; alternatively they could change their 
entire manner of thinking. Words which originate from another kiblat cannot be 
assimilated within the true Islamic understandings of Nurcholish's critics. Taken in, 
they destroy one's capacity to understand correctly.
Many of those who responded to Nurcholish stress that Islam is itself tolerant and 
that Jews and Christians fare well under Muslim rule. The converse, they say, is not 
true. They do not fear the presence of non-Muslims within Islamic society, they say. 
They fear, rather, that someone or something shows up through the intervention of 
Nurcholish and others trained by orientalists; that someone, the originator of the 
dangerous messages, remains abroad. It is not the presence of Jews themselves that 
they object to. For all practical purposes there are no Jews in Indonesia, and it is not 
claimed that there are, as I have said.22 They fear, rather, Zionist influence, and they 
conflate Zionists and Jews. Furthermore, Zionist influence has nothing much to do 
with Israel. The misconceptions of orientalists originate in Europe or America, not in 
Israel, and it is not clear what political benefit there would be to Israel if, for instance, 
Nurcholish Madjid gained influence in Indonesia.23 Zionist influence means harm to
21 See Hadiyanto, "Nucholish Itu Neo Marxis" ("This Nurcholish is a NeoMarxist"), Media Dakwah, 
December 1992, p. 49; Muchlish Abdi, "Angap Saja Angin Lalu" ("Simply think of him as wind that has 
passed by"), Media Dakwah, December 1992, p. 50.
22 There are some who know of the Jewish community in Surabaya or who have heard that there is a Jew 
who lives in a certain part of Jakarta. But these people are not thought to be a threat, whereas Jews, always 
abroad, are.
23 The closest one comes to a political notion in this thinking is when three reporters from Jakarta 
newspapers, including Islamic papers, went to Israel. It was said that they wanted to prepare the way for 
the recognition of Israel by Indonesia. The other political event came when a Jewish diplomat was 
nominated as American ambassador to Indonesia, evoking much protest.
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Indonesian Muslims through the actions or speech of those taken to be Indonesian 
Muslims controlled by those at a distance.24
Media Dakwah, to which I want to turn now in order to discuss its anti-Semitism, is 
not an organ of "fundamentalists" insofar as that word means religious figures who 
insist on a scripturalist interpretation of the Koran.25 Media Dakwah, rather, is an organ 
of "modernists"; its chief ancestral figure is Mohammed Natsir, who was an important 
Islamic reformer. An Islamic modernist in the Indonesian context meant someone who, 
in the 1930s, in the name of Islam and of the Indonesian nation, advocated the 
establishment of Western-style education rather than Koranic schools; who worked for 
the emancipation of women, meaning he favored modem dress and education for 
them; and who, with independence, preferred the inclusion of all groups of the 
archipelago in the nation to the establishment of a state ruled by Islamic law.26 Media 
Dakwah continued to welcome changes in Indonesian society. It looked on the new 
conglomerates to be found in Jakarta as promising vehicles for the spread of Islam. 
Media Dakwah introduced prayer sessions and religious instruction in those 
conglomerates mn by Muslims and in certain government banks as well. On the other 
hand, they thought corporate enterprise largely favored Indonesian Chinese at the
24 "Distance" can be historical. One Media Dakwah article claimed that Nurcholish's proposals closely 
resembled those of Annie Bessant and the Theosophical Society. The Theosophical Society was active in 
the early part of the century in Indonesia. The Research Team of Media Dakwah responsible for the article 
sees it as still operating in an important way. In their opinion, the Theosophical Society was a branch of 
British Freemasonry controlled in the early part of the century, at least, from Madras. They believe it is 
particularly dangerous as a front organization not only for Freemasonry but for Jews:
It is here that the Islamic community has to be particularly on the alert. And from now on no 
longer think of Nurcholish as the person who was once head of the HMI [Muslim Students 
Organization]. Nurcholish now, whether he is aware of it or not, is Nurcholish who, directly or 
indirectly, is campaigning [mengampanyekan] for the thinking of the Theosofische Vereeniging 
which very clearly forms part of the net of the Jewish International.
They go on to say that the Theosofische Vereeniging in colonial times did not seek to spread its teachings. 
It is all the more deplorable that Nurcholish is thought to be an Islamic figure; he uses his extensive 
knowledge of Islam to spread Theosophical thinking. "This is most effective for the group of Orientalists 
and Islamacists in misleading the community." See Tim Laporan Utama, "Penyerahan diri," Yes, Islam, 
'N o/" Media Dakwah, December 1992, p. 47; 44-47. They conclude: "We have to be very careful about 
whatever Nurcholish launches at us. He can zig-zag in the astonishing way peculiar to the character of 
Jews. Islamic community, beware." p. 47. See also the accompanying article by the Tim Riset, "Nucholish 
Madjid dan Annie Besant," Media Dakwah, December 1992, pp. 44-45.
25 For another view, see William Liddle, who indeed thinks of this strain of Indonesian Islam as 
scripturalist. "Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Satu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam Masa Orde 
Bam," Ulumul al-Qur'an, July 1993.
26 On the question of the Islamic headdress, jilbab in Indonesian, Media Dakwah reports various Islamic 
opinions as to whether or not it is required dress. The periodical is most concerned with cases where in 
public schools and factories, the wearing of the jilbab had been banned. See the issues of February 1983, 
April 1984, September 1985, November 1985, March 1989, January 1991, February 1995, and March 1995 
for numerous articles on the subject. For a discussion of the place of the jilbab in Indonesia today see 
Suzanne Brenner, "Reconstructing Self and Society: Javanese Muslim Women and the Veil," American 
Ethnologist 23,4 (1996): 673-697. For a general discussion of the issue see Anne Emmanuelle Berger, "The 
Newly Veiled Woman: Irigaray, Specularity and the Islamic Veil," Diacritics 28,1 (Spring 1998): 93-119.
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expense of small-scale Muslim traders. Their objections to "capitalism" seem to be 
linked to their concerns about the Chinese.27
The genealogy of Media Dakwah is found in the Indonesian elite; that is, its ancestry 
comprises people who had benefited from Western-style education and who had 
worked for the enlargement of opportunity of those considered less privileged. In the 
1930s and in the 1950s they were eager to have the benefit of Western learning. If their 
attitude in this regard has changed now, it is in part because the notion of the foreign 
which impinges on Indonesia has changed. "The foreign" is no longer the source of 
ideas whose assimilation by Indonesians led to independence and promised to 
generate economic and social development. It is now identified in the first place with 
the market. The writers of Media Dakwah are not against the market as such, but they 
recognize that neither the elimination of the communists nor the introduction of an 
internationalized economy has closed the gap between themselves and "the people," 
now the underclass, in whose name the revolution was fought; rather the opposite has 
happened. The assumption that others, foreigners, knew how to construct a just society 
and that the adoption of methods, means, and ideas from abroad would lead to a 
united national community, has been shaken.28
Nurcholish Madjid addressed himself precisely to such reformist, modernist 
Muslims, saying that it was time to go beyond them. In turn, Media Dakwah devoted 
much space to Nurcholish. The cover of one issue largely given over to him bears the 
title "Where Nurcholish's Thought Comes Out" and has a design showing someone 
entering a maze. At the end of the maze is a Star of David. This reference is to the 
hidden twists of the tongue whose effects, transmitted at a distance, issue from 
Nurcholish's mouth and to those misled by such tricks and twists, who end up as 
Jewish Zionist agents.
Media Dakwah by no means has a monopoly on Indonesian anti-Semitism, but it is 
nonetheless noteworthy for its position near the balancing point of a debate about 
Western influences and Indonesia. The writers and audience of Media Dakwah 
constitute a group that is (or was once) open to Western ideas, that does not absolutely 
oppose the introduction of the global market and the changes it brings, and that favors 
technological change. And it is also anti-Semitic. Media Dakwah points to another sort 
of anti-Semitism, one which does not issue from communal tension nor from the 
suspicion of traders in a peasant society, but rather from the conditions of 
communication that fall under the rubric "globalization."
27 See the articles in Media Dakwah on conglomerates as an opportunity for Islamic activities, October 1991. 
Regarding the Chinese and capitalism, see the collection of articles in Media Dakwah in August 1991 and 
May 1993.
28 Of course there was always the fear in the Sukarno regime that Indonesia would be dominated by 
foreign ideas. This, however, was an effect of Sukarno's attempt at syncretism as he sought a basis in the 
state by accepting diverse non-Indonesian ideologies, including Marxism and "religion" (agama). Today, 
by contrast, the idea of a model for the nation is not at issue. It is assumed that "development" 
(pembangunan) is first of all economic, and the economy is that of the market. In this view, foreign 
influence loses its particularity of origin; capital and technology have no smell. Or at least that is true up to 
the point where capital becomes "Chinese" and occasionally "Jewish." Cf. Sobirin, "Sindikat Cina dan 
Islam dalam Dunia Bisnis" ("Chinese Syndicates and Islam in the World of Business"), Media Dakwah, May 
1993, pp. 47-48.
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Perhaps the leading Western authority on the current state of Indonesian Muslim 
thought and organization, Martin van Bruinessen, suggests that Indonesian Muslim 
support for the Palestinian cause, particularly since the Six Day War, is one reason for 
the great increase in anti-Semitic material during the Suharto period. He is surely 
correct, though as he notes, the conflation of Jews and Zionists is inaccurate and 
unnecessary, making anti-Semitism aberrant.
With the defeat of the communists in 1965-66, Muslims, who were instrumental in 
the overthrow of President Sukarno and who supported the efforts of his eventual 
successor, Suharto, hoped to find their influence increased in the state. They were 
disappointed for a long time. President Suharto promoted a number of Christians to 
important positions in the military and the government, a move that some Muslims 
resented, and when Suharto also granted concessions to Indonesian Chinese in order to 
attract their capital, these signs of favor led some to complain that though Muslims 
formed the majority of the nation, they were politically marginalized. As the New 
Order came to an end, Suharto turned more and more to Muslim groups for support, 
but resentment about being kept out of power persists among certain of them, 
particularly those who write for Media Dakwah.29 Other Muslim groups and leaders, 
including Nurcholish Madjid, found a place for themselves with Suharto.30 One has to 
take into account the changed place of religion in the Indonesian state. Before the New 
Order there was much less conflict between religions than certain Muslims, at least, felt 
to be the case in the 1990s and that has developed into serious violence in certain 
regions since then.
In general, religious sentiment or at least activity has gained in strength in 
Indonesia as the left has been eliminated from the political scene. There were also 
reports of many (one cannot say how many) former leftists who became Christians or, 
less often, Muslims to avoid the consequences of having been party members. One has 
to add as well that with the end of populism as practiced by Sukarno, some of that
29 The Media Dakwah editorial offices are in the yard of a mosque not far from the University of Indonesia, 
in the same building as that of the former Islamic political party, Masjumi, headed by Mohammed Natsir, 
which was banned during the Sukarno period and failed to reestablish itself in the Suharto era. A good 
deal of Media Dakwah's resentment stems from the bitterness of its political failure, in my opinion. In the 
post-Suharto period it hopes to make up for this failure. This was made clear to me when I, along with 
Henri Chambert-Loir of the Ecole Francises d'Extreme-Orient, spoke at length with a number of Media 
Dakwah writers in June 1998.
I might note here that while the Masjumi was modernist in its orientation, Mohammed Natsir was an 
anti-Semite of long standing. Here, for instance, is a statement from a book of his published in 1970. 
Describing "the characteristics of Jews," he says "It is in their character no matter where they are to be like 
worms on the leaves of banana trees. The leaves are destroyed, riddled with holes they made, while their 
bodies get fat, just like worms on leaves. For that reason, they are a people who for centuries have been 
hated everywhere. Thus a few decades ago, before the Second World War, they were chased from Western 
Europe and Eastern Europe. They became a hated people. When Hitler was in power they were put into 
camps where, it is said, several million were killed." He goes on to say that nonetheless Jews were allowed 
to lived in Arab countries. M. Natsir, Masalah Palestina (Jakarta: Penerbit Hudaya, 1970), pp. 12-13.
30 Nurcholish, for instance, was a member of ICMI, the group of Muslim intellectuals formed by Habibie 
when he was vice president.
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movement's ideological fervor passed into the mode of religion. At the same time, new 
divisions have separated Muslims from each other. In the Sukarno era the main 
distinctions were between Muslims closely tied to local traditions and the proponents 
of "modernization." Nurcholish Madjid directed his remarks, we have noted, at the 
latter, not in the name of regionalism but of a changed world in which the "modem" 
no longer could comprehend Indonesian realities. In my opinion he reflects the 
segment of the population whose point of reference is first of all the large city and for 
whom the contention between reformers of another period and their rural opponents is 
without much relevance.
This does not mean that the majority of Indonesians, neither those living in the 
regions nor the urban lower classes, have been forgotten. Media Dakwah, for instance, 
sometimes sees them within the context of a certain embourgeoisement; it reports that 
the conglomerates who support Islamic activities in their businesses appreciate the 
"increased discipline" that regular prayer and sermons produce in their employees.31 
For the most part, however, it regrets that the great underclass, assumed to be Muslim, 
is not represented in national or even local affairs. Nurcholish's remarks, in fact, 
address the failure of Islam in its present condition to appeal to these same people, 
people he wishes to raise in the social scale and whose actions he fears if the situation 
remains as it is. He speaks of toleration of Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and so on. In 
doing so, he calls on the power of a certain Islamic belief to encompass others, 
including this neglected underclass. His toleration would make possible the inclusion 
of everyone currently a citizen by law in the nation. The danger he sees when he 
speaks of cults is not from Buddhists or Christians, but from those, underprivileged, 
who might disrupt national security because of the "gap" between them and people in 
Nurcholish's own class. Those who are potential disrupters of the social order are 
usually referred to as the tnassa, the masses, and they are thought to be Islamic. The 
power of the state and the nation to encompass its citizens is more severely challenged 
by their discontent than it was by the regionalism of the early period of the republic. 
The implicit assumption of the debate on tolerance is the lessened ability of the 
Indonesian nation to encompass its citizens through the assumptions at work in the 
founding of the nation. Islam, in some form or another, is needed to accomplish what 
people fear the state can no longer accomplish.
In the view of Media Dakwah, the Indonesian Chinese pose a problem because they 
incite the underclass. The writers of Media Dakwah also fear the "gap" between the 
middle class and the underclass. They, and many Indonesians, focus on division 
caused by the inequities between wealthy Indonesian Chinese and poor Muslims. This 
formulation conceals the non-Chinese middle class to which the writers themselves 
belong. It perceives the Indonesian Chinese as the cause of disruption and popular 
discontent. The writers of Media Dakwah both justified the anti-Chinese rioting of 1998 
in terms of the need and long suffering of the people, and, at the same time, they 
feared it. In their opinion, once the underclass has proper Muslim leadership, which 
was blocked under the New Order, the problem will be solved.
31 In another example, the "management of Bank BNI in fact feels it benefits—even though [prayer] takes 
time away from business hour—it has the certainty of firmer belief of its employees and that will lessen 
dishonesty, corruption and manipulation." From Aru Syeif Assad, "Bias Dakwah di Lingkungan Bisness," 
Media Dakwah, October 1991, p. 41. This is the introductory article to a series on dakwah in business.
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For Nurcholish, toleration of Christians and Buddhists, meaning "Chinese," is one 
issue; the question of cults is not altogether another. The cults he fears would be 
Islamic, appealing to the underclass. Many middle-class Muslims themselves fear 
Islamic "fanaticism" in a way that is not always different from the sentiment of some 
Americans. To include and tolerate Indonesian Chinese in the nation would ideally 
make them less alien, and thus neutralize them as an object of unwanted attraction for 
the underclass. Indonesian Chinese would no longer incite envy and desire, and 
therefore no longer incite fanatical, "fundamentalist" Islamic notions which are 
actually expressions of that envy. To propose a more tolerant form of Islam is to 
oppose cults and to prevent Indonesian Chinese from (indirectly) playing a role in 
their formation.
Nurcholish wishes to renew Islam so that it may play its necessary political role. 
His opponents wish to return Muslims to power by overcoming those who have 
prevented their accession to power—particularly Indonesian Chinese and Christians— 
and who have thereby prevented the full inclusion of the Muslim underclass in the 
nation. They want a Muslim political party that would speak for this underclass in 
Islamic terms. They perpetuate the thinking of an earlier period in Indonesia, when the 
various cultural strains of the nation each had its own political party. Despite these 
differences, the underlying problem for both Media Dakzvah and for Nurcholish, as for 
the entire Indonesian political class, is the "gap" between the middle and lower classes. 
In the issue of religious toleration, questions of class and religion intersect.32
The state's insistence on religious tolerance is part of its policy of overcoming 
differences within the category "Indonesian." The first of the Five Principles or Panca 
Sila of the Indonesian state, "God is One," requires Indonesians to be believers. They 
can chose between the five religions recognized by the state: Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism, each with its own department within the 
Ministry of Religion. This first principle was adopted to appeal to Muslims who 
wanted a stronger Islamic basis for the state, but were unable or unwilling to have a 
provision obliging Muslims to follow Islamic law adopted at a time when to do so 
threatened national unity.33
Tolerance is guaranteed within the framework of the state. This is the outcome of 
Indonesian nationalism and, in particular, the result of an attempt by Sukarno to 
include all the peoples of the archipelago in the nation. If the monotheism of the first 
principle, belief in one god, was understood to include other religions as well which 
were not monotheistic, this happened because the Five Principles, taken as a whole, 
were thought of as making a place for all the peoples of Indonesia. Perhaps also it was 
because of the syncretism Sukarno practiced, which had its roots in Javanese tradition,
32 Religious toleration is an issue in the New Order because religion itself has become more important. Its 
relation to fear of the underclass and, in turn, the connection between fear of the underclass and anti- 
Semitism is complicated. As noted, the question of religious toleration is not precisely a question of 
ethnicity. Indonesia has nearly nine hundred regional languages and as many ethnic groups. Certain of 
these are Christian, including some Chinese. But "Muslim" is not a coded word for particular ethnic 
groups; it is a category that transcends ethnicity precisely as an element of national identity. Christians too 
in large cities often worship in churches with congregations from diverse ethnic groups.
33 For the history of Panca Sila and particularly of the First Principle, see Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp. 
10-20 and the literature cited therein.
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whereby diverse and even incompatible ideas were routinely brought together as 
proof of the power of the kingdom.34 Later Sukarno announced other principles, such 
as NASAKOM, an acronym of the words meaning "nationalism," "religion," and 
"communism." These incompatible elements were nonetheless joined in a unity which 
found its force in the nation. The proclamation of NASAKOM was again an attempt at 
inclusiveness, another word for which might be "tolerance." The very capacity to hold 
together disparate elements proved the power of the state and the nation. It attested to 
its cultural and even religious force beyond even its political power.
Why Panca Sila survived and NASAKOM did not is a question to be answered by 
political history. But syncretism in any case was out-of-date in the New Order. 
Syncretism was derived, as I have said, from Javanese tradition. But its force outside 
Java, in the nation as a whole, rested not with a fundamental belief in Javanese ideas, 
but with belief in the state as the heir and even the continuation of the revolution. If 
Hinduism, for instance, could be comprised under the monotheism of the state's first 
principle, it was not merely thanks to a political compromise. It was because the nation 
itself, realized during the revolution, had a capacity to include its peoples. Under this 
dispensation, Muslims could be satisfied with the strict sense of "monotheism," while 
Hindus could be assured that somehow it applied to them as well.
There were, then, multiple kiblats from the beginning of the Indonesian state. If it 
was possible in 1945 to ask Muslims to moderate their claims in the interest of national 
unity, it was because the prestige of the revolution made conflict between Indonesians 
insupportable. Now the Islamic faction represented in Media Dakwah asserts that its 
status as a majority within the state gives it the right to decide the terms of toleration, 
and that in religious terms. Nurcholish Madjid, for his part, is not content with a 
purely national source of ethnic inclusiveness; he too turns to Islam. One is left 
wondering what is considered fundamental. The wavering between principles reflects 
the inability of the state to continue to incarnate the revolution in the minds of 
Indonesians.
Nurcholish continues Sukarno's impulse to include. But to raise the basis of 
tolerance is also to show its limits. Nurcholish does not mention Communists, but his 
references to the "gap" between classes is a coded reference to the possibility of their 
return, no doubt in a different form. If he wants to include "everyone," it is not 
everyone in any form at all. His notion of tolerance would overlap with that of the 
state. It would include all Indonesians, but only within the definitions that spell out the 
terms of the first principle. Nurcholish wants to include Christians and Buddhists 
within the limits of acceptability of Islam and of the Indonesian nation. If some of these 
are former Communists, it is not in that capacity that they would be acceptable. As we 
will see, Media Dakwah also fears the inclusion of the same groups. It is more forthright 
in its insistence on exclusion.
At the time of the foundation of the state, the problem was to make national 
identity prevail over regional and religious definitions of person. Today, in the conflict 
over toleration, the problem is different. Class differences have emerged with the 
prosperity of the New Order. These are obscured by the place of Indonesian Chinese, 
who were integrated into the economy by Suharto in return for their investment in the
34 Bennedict R. O'G Anderson, "The Language of Indonesian Politics," Indonesia 1 (April 1966): 89-116.
24 James T. Siegel
Indonesian economy, but kept out of the national universities, the government 
bureaucracy, and the armed forces. This left them available to be considered the 
wealthy, obscuring, as I have said, the newly prosperous non-Chinese. There is also the 
fear of a return to power of Communists, who are unrealistically blamed for social 
unrest. By identifying the Indonesian Chinese and resurrected Communists as the chief 
causes of disunity, the people we have been discussing maintain their belief that unity 
of the nation is still a possibility. If only the rich and the ineradicable force of 
communism did not threaten us, the nation would be unified, and there would be no 
need to have discussions about toleration.
Questions about tolerance (the word is taken from English) and about the 
foundation of the nation are raised together.35 In this context, one's opponents do not 
voice ordinary disagreements. They seem, rather, to speak from somewhere else, from 
presuppositions out of reach of certain interlocutors. One adds to this complication the 
complications raised by voices which are meant to be kept out of the discussion 
entirely, including the voices of Communists somehow left over after the massacres 
and imprisonments of 1965-66, and, for some, the voices of Indonesian Chinese and the 
voice of "the people" (rakyat) who, in the form of the massa, threaten to speak in the 
form of uprising. It becomes a question of who one hears and who one is afraid of 
hearing.
In this situation, one does not fear statements themselves, but instead one fears the 
origin of the communication. The anthropologist and Islamicist Martin van Bruinessen 
tells how a religious scholar from a remote eastern island of Indonesia complained 
about cassettes of recitation of the Koran. The recordings were perfect; the Koran was 
chanted as it should be. People listened to them enthusiastically. That, indeed, troubled 
the religious scholar. Instead of chanting the Koran themselves, the people of the 
island listened to the cassettes. Their faith weakened. It was, he said, the result of a 
Jewish plot. It was entirely a question of the origin of the recordings. Nothing in the 
recorded words themselves indicated their origin. Everything recognizable was as it 
should be. And yet there was something else, something unrecognizable about these 
perfect recordings. What this scholar found in the unrecognizable was a distant origin. 
He saw in it a communicative force with the power to put words in the ears of 
believers and make them want to hear these words over and over again. He labeled 
this the work of Jews.
The subtle mistranslations of Nurcholish Madjid likewise arrive from some distant 
place, according to his opponents. He cannot be convinced to recognize their perverse 
source, and it is the source, rather than the content of the translation or mistranslation, 
that is truly at issue here. Were Nurcholish himself to be the origin of mistranslation, 
his intentions would be readable and he would be correctable. He, however, says 
something that makes his opponents certain its origin is not with him at all; the real 
source of the message is far away. The consequences of hearing this message, like the 
consequences of listening to the tapes discussed above, are potentially catastrophic. 
The messages have a power which cannot be guessed at and which extends far beyond
35 One could say that until the New Order Indonesia had less need of this word because it had a way of 
accounting for differences derived from the templates of Javanese mythology which, while not at all part 
of official state formulations, worked in practice. See Bennedict R. O'G. Anderson, Tolerance and the 
Mythology of the Javanese (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1965).
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the effect of what they seem to say. In that sense the true sources of the message 
remain as unrecognizable as the identities of those who fabricated the perfect Koranic 
chanting on the tapes. Nurcholish is said to be the bearer of singular effects which 
could, in fact, mean anything other than what they should mean.
Seen from one side Nurcholish is the bearer of obscure, distant, and catastrophic 
messages; from the other, he is a man who wants to save his country from the menace 
of violence and even disintegration by bringing something as yet unheard to his 
nation. For these people who trust him, his message is limited and precise. For his 
opponents, rather than for himself, he represents the possibility of a messiah, 
unwanted of course, because what he says contains the possibility of meaning 
anything at all; all possibilities, including those as yet unknown, are open.
This messianic possibility arises out of the disturbed horizons of the Indonesian 
nation. And yet the unknowability of Nurcholish to his opponents is not wholly 
reducible to that disturbance. It is not only that Nurcholish is oriented to falsehood; it 
is rather that the term "Jew" indicates a source of falsehood which is as potent in its 
consequences as it is difficult to locate. Though "Jew" and Zionist are conflated in this 
way of thinking, Israel, as I have said, is not considered to be the source of 
Nurcholish's errors. The named places—Chicago, Paris, Germany—are mere stopping 
points for Jews whose place of residence is unimportant. It does not matter if they are 
American, French, or German, for instance; what matters is that they are Jews.
One cannot derive the Jewish "elsewhere" from the complicated array of diverse 
kiblat—communist, Buddhist, etc. It is beyond all of these. It is unlike them in that 
those with such an orientation—Jews—are not on the Indonesian scene in an explicit 
way. One comes across them only by chance, it seems. One knows the kiblats of others 
besides Jews because they point to them, but the Jewish kiblat designates an 
"elsewhere" without an indicator. It remains for us to see what it has to do with other 
voices and other kiblats found today in Indonesia.
References Abroad
There were, of course, Dutch Jews in the Dutch East Indies as well as descendants 
of Jews from the Middle East. There remains today a synagogue in the port of 
Surabaya, but the Jewish community was never prominent in the Indies.36 In any case,
361 am told by the historian Claude Guillot of the CNRS that in the 1980s there are no more than a handful 
of members left in this synagogue. It had been used mainly by Jewish traders from what is now Iraq. The 
old man in charge of the synagogue told Guillot that, asked by Indonesians his descent, he says "Iraqi" 
and, though they know that he is in charge of the synagogue, he is then perceived as an Arab. As soon as 
the Jew appears in Indonesia he disappears.
A Jewish traveler had this to say about the condition of Jews in 1925:
"I learned that there were several hundred Jews—perhaps as many as 2,000—scattered about from 
Batavia to Surabaya, but as many of them concealed their Jewish origins it was impossible to form an 
approximate estimate of their numbers. Dutch Jews had been living in the country for a very long period 
and had played an important part in its commercial development.. . .  There were many Jews occupying 
Government positions, the most prominent being the Resident of Surabaya.. . .  But there was no Jewish 
life in the communal sense, mixed marriages were frequent, and the only form of association consisted of a 
few struggling Zionist societies." Israel Cohen, The Journal of a Jewish Traveller (London: John Lane, The 
Bodley Head Limited, 1925), pp. 211-212.1 am indebted to John Pemberton for bringing this source to my
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today's references to Jews do not refer to actual populations. The Jew is neither an 
unwanted figure who already exists in Indonesia nor is he the excluded one, which 
would imply that he could at some point become an element of the local population. 
The Jew as object of anti-Semitism remains abroad, and it is assumed he always will, 
his references being Zionism, orientalists, and Koranic pronouncements. It is only his 
effects that are feared.
Westerners often compare the Indonesian Chinese population to Jews because they 
are a minority that came from abroad and because many of them are traders. One 
might think that they would be taken as crypto-Jews in the thinking of anti-Semites. 
This is not the case. There is seldom an explicit identification between Chinese and 
Jews,37 but I want to present an example which shows how, nonetheless, the Jew 
showed up in the pages of Media Dakwah when churches were burned as a result of 
conflict between Muslims and Indonesian Chinese.
There is a long history of contention between those termed "Chinese" (I put the 
term in quotes to signal that they are merely of Chinese descent—often, indeed, of 
mixed ancestry—and are culturally and by citizenship Indonesians) and other 
Indonesians. Under Sukarno Chinese education and the use of Chinese characters for 
store names were banned. Indonesian Chinese have been encouraged to replace their 
Chinese names with other names, usually Javanese or Arabic, and many have done so. 
They are, in the eyes of mainland Chinese, indistinguishable from other Indonesians. 
But they are accused of having favored the Dutch during the revolution and of being 
less than reliable in their fidelity to the nation, as evidenced by the popular fear, 
widespread before the change of regime in 1998, that they would expatriate their 
capital during the economic crisis. On the one hand, they are acknowledged as 
Indonesian citizens, Indonesian by culture and language; on the other hand, they are 
distinguished as separate by small identifying marks, such as the initials WNI (Warga 
Negara Indonesia) which stand for "Indonesian citizen," and by other terms indicating 
the distinction imposed on them by their fellow Indonesians.
All of this might favor an identification of "Chinese" with Jews. When it happens, 
however, it is done only vaguely but, nonetheless, at a significant, specific point in the 
discourse. Let me illustrate through the treatment of certain Indonesian Chinese in the 
columns of Media Dakwah. In March, 1997, the magazine had an issue devoted mostly 
to anti-"Chinese" riots in which churches were burned in certain Javanese cities and 
their surroundings. In Rengasdengklok, the Pentecostal Church was burned; in the 
area as a whole, four churches were burned, as was a bank, while many shops were 
looted. Outside the city a vihara was also burned. This last event attracted international
attention.
Another observer, Eze Nathan, generally confirms Cohen's report but adds that after the coming of 
Jews from India in the late nineteenth century there was "a semblance of communal life in a few cities." 
Writing in 1986, he says that from the time of the Japanese occupation there has been "scarcely a single 
Jewish family left in Indonesia." The History of Jews in Singapore: 1830-1945 (Singapore: HERBILU Editorial 
and Marketing Services, 1986), pp. 175-176.
37 On the identification of the two by Southeast Asians, see Daniel Chirot, "Conflicting Identities and the 
Dangers of Communalism," in Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast 
Asia and Central Europe, ed. Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1997), p. 5.
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attention, as an Australian photographer from Associated Press Television was present 
when the statue of Buddha was hung by the neck from an arch at the entrance to the 
burning temple. His recording of the event was shown on CNN.38 Despite this, the 
attention of Media Dakivah focused on the churches and not on the vihara. There were 
similar events in other nearby cities which it also reported. Media Dakwah was upset 
because Muslims were blamed for the fires and the riots. They did not deny that 
Muslims set these churches and shops afire, but they felt that these Muslims were 
justified in doing so. The problem began during the fasting month, when an 
Indonesian Chinese called Cik Gue (Media Dakwah writes it "Cigue"; for convenience I 
will follow their practice) complained because she was woken up by the beating of the 
drums in the mosque, calling believers for the optional prayer often made during the 
nights of the fasting month. Here is an account of the incident by a local Muslim 
teacher:
At 2:55 am people here usually strike the drum announcing the time to prepare 
breakfast (early because it must be before dawn) for five minutes until 3:00 am. 
This has gone on for years. But for some reason, Cigue had a toothache and right 
away swore at the kids in the mosque, using dirty words—dog, pig, stupid. Then 
she called the police, and the police straightway took down the names of the boys 
in the mosque. After the police came she [Cigue] overacted [in English], feeling 
she had protection. So she cursed some more. Finally, the masses were angry, she 
was beaten up, and the police could no longer break up the masses. As time went 
on more and more people came.39
If Cigue, rather than the rioters, is to blame for the riot, it is not merely because Cigue 
lost her temper and her husband threatened to call the police. It is also because she 
acted with the confidence of one who was "protected" when she made her complaint; 
she is able to act with impunity toward Muslims because she feels that the 
governmental authorities are on her side, favoring "Chinese." Muslims are a majority, 
but they are blamed for the faults of others. Here is the statement of another local 
religious teacher on the same riots:
We are very disturbed that the Islamic community is blamed for the incident; 
always blamed, forced into a comer. Why not blame the people who triggered it 
[menjadi pemicu]? The ones who triggered the flare up [sic] were not Muslims. 
Why should it only be Muslims who are pursued? . . . Because if indeed the
38 Andreas Harsono, ed., Huru-hara RengasdetigMok (Uproar in Rengasdengklok) (n.p. [Jakarta]: Institut 
Studi Arus Informasi, 1997), p. 18. The same report notes that a reporter from Agence France Presse 
photographed an Indonesian soldier looking gleefully at the suspended statue.
39 An interview with Ustad Holid A., an ulama and head of a school in the area. Komar, Joko, Taufik, Nuh, 
"Mereka Membentuk Geng Tersendiri: Warga keturunan Cina selama ini bersifaat ekslusif. Hal ini 
memicu kerusuhan dengan kebencian yang kental" ("They formed their own Gang: Those of Chinese 
descent act without regard. This triggers unrest and deep hatred"), Media Dakwah, March 1997, pp. 54-55.
A team of social scientists investigating the incident say that Cigue is really "Cik Gue," "Cik" being 
Chinese for "older sister." They say also that the woman had Indonesianized her name, taking, in fact, an 
Arabic name, Nurhayati. Andreas Harsono, ed., Huru-hara Rengasdengklok, p. 6.
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Islamic community is to blame for the flare up, it's only for the smoke. The fire is 
them (non-Islam— editor). I said the same to the police chief.40
These speakers do not claim that the churches had a connection with Cigue. In any 
event, it is unlikely that Cigue belonged to more than one of them, if to any at all. It is 
rather that Cigue's bad temper is taken as characteristic of "Chinese." Typically, these 
speakers claim, such Chinese do not respect the customs of their neighbors. The 
subtitle of one of the articles concerned states: "Those of Chinese descent act without 
regard. This triggers unrest and deep hatred." This is, indeed, the charge some 
Javanese often level against their "Chinese" neighbors, that they keep themselves apart 
from others in the community and do not respect Javanese ways.
"They, 'Chinese/ cause the trouble while we, Muslims, take the blame." When a 
writer makes this claim, he registers his complaint against the actions of the police who 
subdued the Muslim rioters, and perhaps also against the national papers and their 
coverage of the riots.41 "Chinese" are accused also of cheating in the market place; 
substituting eighteen for twenty-four-karat gold, not giving full measure when they 
sell vegetables, and so on. All such complaints stem from a general conviction that the 
Muslim majority in Indonesia, while so often showing tolerance toward others, is not 
only taken advantage of by those they tolerate, but is also ignored and abused by its 
own government.
The result is the accumulation of grievances which Muslims say they have every 
reason to think should be corrected by the government. They do not invoke equal 
protection of the laws, but the feeling that the government is by rights theirs since they 
are the vast majority. They complain that their protests to the government are never 
rightly heard; instead, such protests only attract suspicion. They perceive themselves 
as the victims. But the burned out churches indicate to others that they are intolerant 
and at fault. If they act against the Indonesian Chinese and not against the 
government, it is because they identify themselves with the nation; though the 
government is not in their control, they think of it as symbolically their own. It is the 
"Chinese" who prevent it from being more than symbolically theirs.
Another religious teacher complained that when the regent in his community 
issued a permit to build a new church, the Christians, meaning "Chinese," built one 
almost twice the size, even adding a second story.
Everyone knows that this is contempt [melecehkan] for the regulations. We even 
had a meeting with the Council. Write this down, we aren't anti-church, anti- 
Christian.42
This teacher of some of the rioters presents himself as a defender of the regulations, of 
the national government. A prominent "Chinese" from the area denied the charge. The
40 Komar, Joko, Zuki, Nuh, "H. Sobarna Noor, Sekretaris MUI Rengasdengklok: Bom Waktu di 
Rengasdengklok. Rumah berubah menjadi gereja itulah bom waktu yang meladak di kota bersejarah itu" 
("H. Sobama Noor, Secretary MUI [Council of Islamic Scholars] Time Bomb in Rengasdengklok: Houses 
turning into churches are a time bomb exploding in this historic city"), Media Dakwah, March 1997,
pp. 53-54.
41 See in particular Kompas for January 27,1997.
42 More precisely he said that the permit had not yet been officially issued but that there was provisional 
authority to construct the church. Andreas Harsono, ed., Huru-hara Rengasdengklok, p. 81.
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implication of the teacher is that Indonesian Chinese enjoy better relations with 
officials because "Chinese" have bribed the officials. The teacher is not against the law, 
he is for it. But when the local officials do not enforce it, they, Muslims, must enforce it 
themselves, even if they do so paradoxically with illegitimate violence. "Chinese" are 
contemptuous of the country and are not fully Indonesian. It is not a question of legal 
citizenship but of moral status. "They," "Chinese," should become Indonesian in the 
full sense by participating in the community while respecting the rights of the 
majority. "We," Muslims, are ready to defend the law even to the point where we must 
take on the opprobrium of the government and of public opinion and of the police, the 
agents of the law.43 We act out of desperation. It is not simply that only violence is left; 
it is also that in the absence of law enforcement, to act outside the law is to institute it. 
When "Chinese" understand that they cannot bribe officials and cannot act outside the 
community, the law will work again.
The events at Rengasdengklok and other nearby places are, in the view of Media 
Dakzoah, not merely the results of accumulated past grievances; they are also an 
indication of trouble in the future. They indicate the presence of a "time bomb" (bom 
waktu). A riot is the call of people who have become convinced that they are powerless 
and unheard. The religious teacher above, for instance, says that the trouble in 
Rengasdengklok began in 1978 and has been continuous. "But these are sharp pebbles, 
a time bomb they have planted." He explains the machinery of the time bomb by 
saying it concerns questions of the economy, business politics of the "Chinese," social 
questions, and also many questions that concern religion. All this adds up to the point 
where:
. .  . there is jealousy and there are many questions that concern religion. Indeed, 
they have not put up any new churches. But houses that have been turned into 
churches . . . .  [ellipses in original], these are numerous. Yeah, these are new 
churches, new churches. I told the regent straight out and the chief of police. It 
was the first time I was "arrested"; I wasn't really arrested just questioned 
[dinterogasi] and asked for explanations. After there were indications of people in 
their twenties [i.e., possibly his students].
And then?
Ya . . .  [ellipsis in original]. I said there are no new churches. But there are many 
houses that have turned into churches. The time bomb issue; the people 
[masyarakat] urged the council of religious scholars to protest the church built by 
Oklih. Oklih is the Director of Pantura Bank.
What is at issue?
The regent's permit is for a church of 400 square meters, but they built 730 square 
meters, and they made it two stories. The regent and his assistant do not allow 
churches to be built larger than the church in the regency capital [Karawang]. But 
this is actually the biggest church in West Java. Everyone knows that they have 
contempt for the regulations. We even met with the Council. Write this down: we 
are not anti-church, anti-Christian.
You mean an attitude of tolerance?
43 One notes that these Muslims claim to be the majority and, at the same time, find themselves 
condemned by most Indonesians, most of whom are themselves Muslims.
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Really we live next to them in peace. But procedures have to be gone through. 
There should not be [a permit] for one limit and then a church built for more than 
that. There, that's the time bomb if the officials don't deal with it. We asked that 
the government tear down what's over the limit. But it's never been done. The 
regent himself doesn't understand. He just knows that Oklih built a church 
within the procedures. So that's the symptom that something is hidden in the 
background.
You mean things have accumulated?
He then goes on to speak of the beating of the drum in the middle of the night. People 
should understand that it is the fasting month, he says, and restrain their feelings.
Religious conflicts are the culmination of other problems. These budding conflicts 
are represented by a sign, which is the multiplication of churches. Like the act of 
building churches larger than permitted by law, these churches themselves have no 
legal standing. The result is that one cannot tell for sure whether they exist or not. The 
speaker says the Christians have built no new churches; then he says that homes have 
been turned into churches. For instance, asked how many churches there are in 
Rengasdengklok, the religious scholar answers:
A lot. Officially there are only four. But this does not include residences which 
have been made into churches. Up till now I don't know exactly the number 
because they do not have official permits. They aren't registered.44
These churches symbolize a series of grievances. Their appearance has an inevitable 
and autonomous course of its own. What is one day a house the next day is a church. 
Churches simply appear, and no force can stop them. People do not know how many 
there are. The "time bomb" has exploded. At this point we have moved from 
discussing an individual "Chinese" who "triggered" the burnings with her complaints, 
to the workings of a force whose agents are nameless and whose places of appearance 
are uncertain.
Media Dakwah reproduces photographs of burned out churches with captions 
which indicate their significance:
A Church the Victim of Unrest: They are built on a magnificent scale often 
without legal permits.45
Indonesian, which lacks both tenses and a plural form, permits one to say, "it was built 
. . . "  and "they are being built . . . "  in the same words. The effect is to make a unique 
case, the church in the picture, typical. It is not merely that the church is like others in 
its display of extravagant expenditure. It is also that, seeing it in a photograph, already, 
of course, a form of duplication, and reading the caption, one is linked to multiple 
examples. One leaves the historical and even the narrative, which is to say the 
connection between the drumming in the mosque and the reaction of Cigue and the 
accumulated grievances which magnified the significance of the incident. The account 
slips and expands, so that it threatens the automatic replication of more churches with,
44 Komar, Joko, Zuki, Nuh, "H. Sobarna Noor, Sekretaris MUI Rengasdengklok: Bom Waktu di 
Rengasdengklok," Media Dakwah, March 1997, pp. 53-54.
45 Caption to photograph, Team Media Dakwah, "Buntut Kerusuhan: Ramai-ramai Menyudutkan Islam," 
Media Dakwah, March 1997, pp. 42-47, esp. 42.
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as a consequence, more arson to come. This is the "time bomb" not only as it was but 
as it is to come.
Churches as symbols of past grievances are one thing. Churches which 
continuously appear out of homes have a tinge of the uncanny. Burning them down 
does not solve the problem. It merely speaks of a moment of provocation. The 
implication is that the churches will continue to appear and that they will be found 
unbearable again some time in the future.
"Write this down, we aren't anti-church, anti-Christian," the religious teacher tells 
the reporter. He thus asserts that burning the Churches was an action directed against 
"Chinese," not against Christians. The congregations of these churches were likely to 
be mixed, yet the churches are thought of as the work only of "Chinese." It is 
"Chinese" who are thought to have bribed government officials, and it is "Chinese" 
who are thought to have paid for the churches. Churches that were not "magnificent," 
that is, did not display the amount of money invested in them, might be merely 
"Christian." The "gap" between "Chinese" and "us" which causes the "time bomb" is 
formed by money: "they" have it and "we" do not. But it is also formed by the refusal 
of "Chinese" to mix with their Javanese neighbors. "Chinese" in this sense signifies 
"wealth" and also exclusiveness.
Indeed, wealth, or at least "Chinese" wealth, is thought to lead to exclusiveness. 
Here is a report from the team of Indonesians who investigated the events at 
Rengasdengklok which I have already cited. The writers of Media Dakivah are unlikely 
to find it objectionable:
Kim Tjoan [the husband of Cigue], Cigue and their children are thought by 
the people of [the neighborhood] to be a family that does not mix much with 
their neighbors. Small incidents related by their neighbors show the objections 
and difficulties of the family in mixing socially. Mrs. Weskomi, the wife of a 
teacher, one of the figures of the neighborhood, knows Cigue to be a difficult 
person. "Earlier when the Chinese were poor, they did mix [bergaul], but now 
that they have their own store and house they are remote. In fact, they live right 
in our midst," she said. When Cigue talks with the neighbors, she only goes up to 
the fence of her house.
Once there was an incident, a sweet sop fruit ripening in Cigue's yard was 
picked by a neighbor's child who was also of Chinese descent. This event raised 
problems between the two families. Cigue could not contain her feelings, Oen 
Ceng Bouw whose house is right in front of Cigue's, said. Cigue charged Oen 
Ceng Bouw's child with being a thief.46
The gap between "Chinese" and other Indonesians might be thought to provoke 
jealousy. But here the logic is not exact. If it is true that other Indonesians want what 
"Chinese" have, they do not want to have it in the same way. It is often the case, for 
instance, in anti-"Chinese" riots in Java, that stores are looted only to have the goods 
burned. Not to keep the goods for oneself is a way of showing that what "Chinese"
46 Andreas Harsono, edv Huru-hara Rengasdengklok, p. 11.1 have changed their spelling of Cigue (Cik Gue) 
to match that of Media Dakwah.
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value is not what one values oneself.47 One remains uninfluenced by wealth. Cigue 
and her family, however, are charged with having wealth inflect their relations to their 
neighbors. When they were able to own their own shop and their own house, they set 
themselves apart. For a child to take a piece of fruit from a neighbor's tree would be 
considered part of the way that neighbors share belongings. Cigue comes to think 
differently. She no longer "mixes," which in the first place means "talk with" but here 
means also mixing property. She and her family live apart. They no longer talk to their 
neighbors and they no longer understand them.
Wealth leads to separation. But "in fact, they live right in our midst." It is a strange 
prejudice that wants those who are disliked to take a larger part in the community. Of 
course the anticipated result is that once such people mix, they will no longer be upset 
when they are awakened by a drum before dawn. The complaint is that without such 
"mixing," "Chinese" become strangers. These "Chinese" are not different by custom or 
descent. Nor do they begin as being different; Cigue was once "like us," but she 
became not merely different but unreachable once she became wealthy. Separation is 
intolerable, not merely because it causes difficulties between those still living side by 
side but because, even before there are problems, those who have become strangers 
take on a ghostly tinge.
The complaint is that such people are still present and yet are removed. Where 
does Cigue keep herself when she is not mixing with Muslims? She is rumored to be 
insane.48 This report of insanity is actually a hyperbolic form of the statement that 
"Because 'Chinese' do not mix they do not understand 'us'," except here the statement 
is comprehended through a reversal: "we do not understand them." There is a 
connection between the spectral churches that keep appearing out of houses, which is 
to say, out of nowhere, and the spectral neighbors who, because of their idea of 
property, keep to themselves and thus choose to live "nowhere": wealth marks 
"Chinese" as not merely different but as having an incomprehensible provenance.
"Chinese" are often thought to be wealthy when they are not. They are the 
repositories of imaginary wealth not merely in the sense that they may not own 
anything more than their neighbors, but in the sense that their wealth is 
incomprehensible, coming as it does from other sources than those thought to be 
available to Javanese. A Javanese, for instance, who finds something unusual, perhaps 
a number printed upside down by accident on a train ticket, might well use that 
number to bet on the lottery. If he were to win and to become wealthy, it would be a 
mark of the way in which the supernatural favors him. It would give him a new and 
honorable position within Javanese society. His wealth, unlike "Chinese" wealth, 
would come from an uncanny force whose provenance, though not known, is at least 
usable and integrated into everyday life. "Chinese" wealth removes "Chinese" from 
the society of their neighbors and comes from a source not open to these neighbors.
The "elsewhere" of Cigue, alone with her possessions, is not the same "elsewhere" 
as the source of a winning lottery number. It is not available to her Javanese neighbors. 
She is, in that sense, more than merely "odd" [aneh], the term used for the misprinted
47 See James Siegel, Solo in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), pp. 234ff.
48 Andreas Harsono, ed., Huru-hara Rengasdengklok, pp. 11-12.
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train ticket that indicates a possible uncanny source for the numbers. Though still so 
termed, she is beyond that category as it functions between Javanese, and thus she is 
unlocatable. Nonetheless, her neighbors remain acutely aware of her. From this 
perspective, the problem with the "gap" between presumably wealthy "Chinese" and 
their Muslim neighbors is not that it is unbridgable, but that it is not wide enough. 
What they, "Chinese," have is apparent to us. We are bothered by it. Across this gap 
there seems to be continuous communication; but not of the usual sort. "We" are 
bothered by them, by the strange appearances of their churches and by their strange 
relation to property.
That "Chinese" wealth is thought to estrange may be merely an effect of the 
intrusion of the market. However, the market is not at all foreign to Muslim traders. 
There is also the charge that "'Chinese' are a minority in the nation while we are the 
majority, and yet they are wealthy and we are not." The authors of a study of the riot 
in Rengasdengklok note that several "Chinese" there were in fact favored by the 
government. They point out the open secret that to do business, one needs to have 
various government permits and that "Chinese," and not Muslims, got these, usually 
in return for the officials receiving shares in the companies owned by the Chinese 
applicants.49 Furthermore, economic development during the New Order "favored 
Chinese more than others."50 To point to real economic differences, however, is not to 
explain how the rivalries between "Chinese" and Muslim traders become generalized 
or how they function in a national setting. Most important to us, it does not explain 
how an economic rivalry yields a view of "Chinese" as somehow uncanny.
The conflict between neighbors is also a conflict between co-nationals at a certain 
point in time. The gap referred to is nation-wide; it is the division between rich and 
poor Indonesians. Economically, sociologically, such a division marked the very 
inception of the nation. However it was always intended to be closed. Inherent in the 
idea of "the people" [rakyat] was that the educated class would lead them out of 
poverty and ignorance. The populist policies of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, 
fostered this idea. With the New Order of General Suharto, however, populism was set 
aside in favor of Development (Pembangunan). The expansion of the market in fact 
benefited most people; the level of poverty, for instance, was drastically reduced. It 
also marked the strong development of a well-to-do middle class, including both 
"Chinese" and non-"Chinese." The "gap" is the wound to the unity of the national 
body as it is felt with this augmented division of classes. It is blamed on "Chinese," the 
richest of whom were, in fact, favored by Suharto in order to encourage them to invest 
in Indonesia. As I have said, to blame "Chinese" for being wealthy while "we" are not 
is to conceal the well-to-do non-"Chinese" middle class.
In Rengasdengklok, the separation of the rioters from their government is in fact a 
separation dividing two groups of Muslim Indonesians. Yet those who support the 
rioters say the division is caused by "Chinese." They do not hope to cure the nation of 
ethnic "Chinese" by initiating a campaign of "ethnic cleansing"; they hope to cure the 
nation of its own estranged, ghostly members by reintegrating them, making them 
obey the rules. This action would reunite the underclass with the national government.
49 Ibid., p. 90.
50 Ibid., p. 116.
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Until the time when that reunification takes place, "Chinese" will be attacked for 
having caused a rift.
Recognizing "Chinese" means identifying a certain "strangeness," as we have 
noted. The youth who beat the drum and was cursed by Cigue said this about the 
couple:
It's not because they are Chinese that I don't like them. Nor is it because their 
religion is different from ours. It's because they act and they think strangely [yang 
aneh]. They never act like good neighbors. In front of Kim Tjoan's house there is 
another Chinese, Ceng Bouw. He is totally different, wants to be a good neighbor 
and likes to shoot the breeze [ngobrol] in the neighborhood-watch guardhouse in 
front of the meeting place for prayer.51
This youth uses the word aneh, meaning "strange," a word that also means 
"supematurally strange," as I have noted. For him, "Chinese" who do not spend time 
in talk with their neighbors are uncanny. He recognizes them as neighbors, but he sees 
in them something else as well. This "something else" is not exactly difference, if that 
means positive difference. Rather, he senses that the man or the woman in front of him, 
who does not speak, is concerned with something he cannot grasp. He complains of 
their watak, their nature. Asked if he was taught by someone to dislike Kim Tjoan, he 
replies:
No need to be taught. The others here have the same feelings about Kim Tjoan 
because his watak, his nature, is like that. So that's why he gets it like that. In fact, 
if we could, we'd tear his house down to the ground so he would never come 
back.
The strangeness of Kim Tjoan is apparent. His qualities are visible to everyone. 
Because of this he invites violence. He is recognizable as "strange," "odd," different 
from what one would expect; not entirely recognizable. Hendra Kumia denies that he 
dislikes Kim Tjoan because he is Chinese. If he were not "Chinese," however, one 
might ask if his watak would be so apparent. It is because the strangeness of Kim Tjoan 
is assumed to be shared by other "Chinese" that the riots spread. The uncanny finds its 
locus in the man's ethnic identity. This youth, Hendra Kumia, sees in Kim Tjoan 
something he cannot recognize and knows how to call it: "Chinese"; more precisely: 
'"Chinese' who do not mingle with their neighbors."
"Chinese" such as Kim Tjoan are spoken of as though they are uncanny, but it is 
not clear that their eeriness is of the first order. In the charge "they do not mix," one 
sees the "gap" between classes made concrete. The "Chinese," perceived as 
uncommunicative, refuses to acknowledge his Muslim (and non-Muslim) neighbors. If 
Kim Tjoan were a good "Chinese," like his neighbor Ceng Bouw, he would chat or 
"shoot the breeze," meaning he would say nothing memorable. This, indeed, is the 
habit of Javanese between themselves and their neighbors.52
In most Javanese cities, the well-to-do live on the main streets. Behind these streets 
narrow lanes run through crowded quarters where people of various classes live. In
51 Ibid., p. 29.
52 See Siegel, Solo in the New Order.
Kiblat and the Mediatic Jew 35
the late afternoon the people of these quarters, rising from their siestas, often stand 
outside and chat in a desultory way. It is an example of the "mixing" referred to. In 
1981 when I lived in Surakarta in Central Java, I took a bicycle ride late one afternoon 
along some of these narrow paths. At a certain point, I got down from the bicycle to 
turn it around. As I did so, I heard a woman, only a few feet from me, say, "Ah, he's 
turning around." She might have been surprised that a middle-aged white man would 
be riding a bicycle at all, and even more surprised that I appeared in this remote lane 
in front of her house. In place of an expression of surprise, indeed, I believe, to prevent 
such, she said instead exactly what I was doing, as though naming my activity 
accounted for it and for me. Other times on my bicycle I had been pelted with stones 
and, on foot, I was frequently verbally assaulted. When, however, I addressed my 
assailants in Javanese, merely saying the Javanese equivalent of "hello" or 
reprimanding them gently in the proper speech forms, they were instantly polite and, 
while not apologizing for their behavior, seemed to put it out of mind. These are 
examples of how a stranger (I am tempted to say, "the" stranger) is incorporated into 
language, in such a way he loses any potential to incite surprise. By speaking, I located 
myself alongside the good "Chinese": the alterity I initially displayed was 
obfuscated.53 The effect of mixing is to give Javanese a feeling of peacefulness 
[tenterem] and the sense that nothing disturbing will occur. Not to engage in this 
practice is, indeed, to make oneself into an object of suspicion, whether one is 
"Chinese" or not. Mixing, then, is a way of obscuring differences. Not mixing makes 
differences not apparent but suspected.
The reassurance provided by such nearly contentless speech is not permanently 
effective. Whoever is in the position of the stranger in a Javanese setting can become 
aneh, odd, the stranger, again, as the testimony concerning Kim Tjoan shows. When 
this happens to "Chinese" they are left as the focal point of a certain fascination. 
"Chinese" wealth is imaginary, as I have said, in the sense that whether or not 
"Chinese" have money, their relation to it is mysterious. They keep wealth to 
themselves; it is the material form of their watak perhaps. The "magnificence" of their 
churches is visible, yet it raises the question of the secret sources of their wealth; at 
best, when revealed, this source is corrupt, but even discovery of the source leaves 
unexplained the "Chinese" ability to take advantage of "our" government when "we" 
ourselves cannot do so. Wealth places "Chinese" in a different world. It keeps "us" 
from seeing ourselves in "them." "We" cannot simply ignore it. Indeed, it rivets 
attention. The gap, as I have said, is too easily crossed in the mode of the uncanny as 
the riches that make "Chinese" turn their backs to us come into imagined view.
The result is the terrifying impulse of Hendra Kumia thinking of Kim Tjoan: "So 
that's why he gets it like that. In fact, if we could, we'd tear his house down to the 
ground so he would never come back." The uncanny is unbearable. In fact, Kim 
Tjoan's family was driven out of the neighborhood; Kim Tjoan was sentenced to three 
and half years for incitement of racial sentiments; his wife and daughter were forced to 
move to Jakarta, where at last report they lived in poverty.54 Their house, instead of
531 have discussed these incidents and the role of speech with minimal content in Siegel, Solo in the New 
Order, pp. 55-58.
54 Andreas Harsono, ed., Huru-hara Rengasdengklok, p. 31. Fifty-four rioters, most of them in their teens 
and twenties—mostly students, laborers, and the unemployed—got sentences of about three months.
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being razed, was bought by a nearby Islamic school.55 This approaches ethnic 
cleansing but does not equal it, for there were other "Chinese" left untouched. Several 
residents mentioned Ceng Bouw, a "Chinese" who was protected by a Muslim family 
during the riots, in order to illustrate the good relations between Muslims and 
"Chinese" in their neighborhood.56
If there is not ethnic cleansing in the mode of the ex-Yugoslavia, it is because 
"Chinese" are seen ambivalently. They too are Indonesians. Many Muslims rioted 
against them, and many Muslims protected some of them. The desire to have 
"Chinese" be "normal" is as great as the desire to eliminate them. The Indonesian idea 
of the nation is, indeed, based on its ability to assimilate its peoples, to reconstitute 
those, including "Chinese," into Indonesians no matter what their birth or their mother 
tongue. Marriage alliances across ethnic groups, for instance, indicate the strength of 
the nation. Before the birth of the nation, the ancestors of today's Indonesians could 
not intermarry in this way. Precisely this rupture with the family of origin begat 
Indonesians out of those many people bom into one of the hundreds of groups that 
inhabited that nation of islands. "Chinese," however, often are treated as though they 
are not entirely Indonesians, though intermarriages do frequently take place between 
them and other Indonesians.
The political entity created by the liberation of Indonesians from their own origins 
was the rakyat, the people. No one is bom a member of the people nor is it a 
sociological category. A farmer, for instance, is not a member of the people because of 
his profession, his place of birth, or the language he speaks. He becomes a member of 
the people by a performative act. In the Sukarno era he was one of those the president 
addressed either in the great stadium of the capital or over the radio. When Sukarno, 
who styled himself "the extension of the tongue of the people," spoke in their name, 
those listening, even though hearing certain ideas for the first time, found that these 
ideas did indeed express what they thought. At that point they were members of "the 
people."
The empty talk of the late afternoon does not produce "the people." Indeed, its 
purpose is to blur social differentiation of any sort. The fact that the stranger could 
appear, making such empty talk necessary, however, indicates that new sorts of social 
definition can occur when Indonesians are faced with something odd. The rakyat is 
formed out of such a possibility. It needs the oddity of a someone who speaks and, as 
in the case of Sukarno, after the fact, it needs a number of people to recognize in his 
words, and in himself, what they had always intended and always been. During the 
revolution it was not necessarily Sukarno who formed the focal point of the rakyat; it 
was more often local leaders of small bands, each acting in the name of "Indonesia." 
Their followers became members of "the people," members of a new nation whose 
form of expression was inchoate but which anticipated new political and social forms. 
The revolution, from the point of view of this example, can reoccur. The rakyat can 
reemerge. The insistence on "mixing," which is the suppression of such a possibility, 
indicates the pressure for the reemergence of such a formation.
55 Ibid., p. 10.
56 Ibid., p . l l .
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The populism of the Sukarno period ended with Suharto's New Order. The people 
were without a form of expression. At the same time, by the 1980s differences in 
wealth led to pronounced differences between classes. At this point, we have arrived at 
the "gap" so widely discussed in Indonesian society in the later years of the New 
Order. It expresses the fear of the middle class that "the people" will reemerge. These 
fears shaped the development of events and prevented the massa from becoming the 
rakyat. At the same time, the continuous suppression of the underclass and the idea of 
the gap left the underclass confronting "Chinese." The "odd" figure who did not mix, 
whose difference was feared and who fronted for the middle class as a whole, was at 
once a failed and a rejected leader who could announce another rakyat or "the" rakyat.57
In the evolution of events from the drumming of Hendra Kumia to the burning of 
churches by large numbers of youth, we see the failure of "the people" to form 
themselves. Bereft of true leaders, guided only by speakers who mention the "time 
bomb" after there has been an explosion, "the people" advance to destroy the property 
of those who are thought to impede the restoration of what they once had: a reflection 
of themselves in others who were the means of their identification with the nation.
Jews are never mentioned in Media Dakivah's several interviews or in reports from 
the scenes of church burning. However, in the same issue of Media Dakwah which tells 
of the anti-"Chinese" riots in Rengasdengklok and nearby Tasikmalaya, there is a 
report about a countryside religious school in the same area; this school is said to teach 
heterodox beliefs. Students from orthodox religious schools attacked this heterodox 
school and chased out the teacher. On the ceiling of the mosque there is a star, 
reproduced in a photograph and said to be a Star of David. Nothing at all indicates 
that this school has something to do with Jews. Literature found in the remains of the 
school simply indicated that its leader had expanded the confession of faith and had 
pronounced himself the Imam Mahdi, a heterodox version of the messiah.
The reporter concludes his piece saying
. . .  The case of Buki [the name of the religious teacher] indicates that the provokasi 
of Islam and its community never ceases, both from Jews and Christians. (QS 3: 
120). For years Buki was a thorn in the side of the Tasik Muslim community. For 
the moment the officials did not act quickly enough so that at a certain time the 
masses lost control and it all exploded.58
It is the logic of the time bomb again. But this time, the provocation includes the 
heterodox pronouncement of the coming of the messiah. There is no reason to think 
that there is Jewish influence here. If anything, judging from the presence of a mosque, 
from the name of the foundation which supported the school (Yayasan Marganingrat), 
and from its doctrine as Media Dakwah reports it, it resembles the Javanese version of 
the Imam Mahdi. It is not said to be Jewish itself but to be a "link in the Network of the 
Jewish International" (mata rantai Jaringan Yahudi Intemasional) and at least one part
57 The mob that attacked "Chinese" in Rengasdengklok were not termed rakyat but massa, or "masses."
The difference is in the first place the lack of a leader. The rakyat always needs someone to speak for it. But 
had someone emerged, there still would have been no rakyat. The emergent social formation would still 
have been the massa rather than the rakyat since the new entity lacked permanence and legitimacy.
58 MD team, "Jejak Yahudidi Tasikmalaya, Aliran Buki Sahidin yang sesat" ("The devious movement of 
Bukhi Sahidin: Jewish Traces in Tasikmalaya"), Media Dakwah, March 1997, pp. 50-52.
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of an "organ of conspiracy" [organ konspiratif] to crush Islam." The title refers not to 
Jews but to their traces ("Jewish Traces in Tasikmalaya"). Once again, the reference to 
Jews is made by the reporters and is not said to be part of local interpretations.
The introductory piece to the articles of this issue speaks of "Christianization and 
various networks such as Jewishization and Chinese conspiracy [konspirasi]—with 
motives of trade which ceaselessly try to crush Islam in this country; it's really 
obviously right in front of your nose."59 The Jew, in this piece, appears not as a figure 
that arouses the resentment of the lower class, but as part of an interpretation of 
society by middle-class modernist writers. He appears not in life or even in local 
accounts, but in the medium of Media Dakivah. He is only vaguely adduced in these 
reports. He does not appear as a Chinese or Christian or even a heterodox Muslim. 
Chinese, Christians, heterodox preachers are not substitutes for Jews, nor are they Jews 
in disguise. One cannot trace a direct connection between Jews and those who are part 
of the Indonesian landscape, no doubt because Jews remain unrecognizable. In the way 
that the face of the despised Jew disappears into that of the valued Arab, the Jew, when 
his influence reaches Indonesia, retreats from making a direct appearance. Even to call 
these "Chinese" and Javanese Jewish "agents" is too strong; they merely bear "traces" 
marking them as Jews.
"For years Buki was a thorn in the side of the Tasik Muslim community. For the 
moment the officials did not act quickly enough so that at a certain time the masses lost 
control and it all exploded." The Jewish effect, in these incidents, is the feeling of 
intolerable menace which cannot be accounted for by the accumulation of past 
grievances. Buki himself never makes an appearance and, of course, whatever Jew was 
thought responsible for the Star of David, however indirectly, does not. And no one 
expects this Jew to appear. The Jew, we have said repeatedly, remains absent from the 
scene. In that sense, the Jew features even more strongly than reclusive "Chinese" as 
the nonreflecting mirror of the Indonesian Muslim underclass. The very distance of 
America, Europe, and wherever else Jews are thought to have lived helps to bring 
them onto the Indonesian scene. They come to mind at the point where one cannot 
account for the force of appearance when one's opponent seems to say amazing things 
or when painted stars appear in mosques. The absence of the Jew means that he can 
never be directly addressed. His effects mean that he is nonetheless present and in 
communication with certain Indonesians. They are affected by Jews, but they cannot 
make themselves felt by those Jews through their own initiative. It is the situation that 
pertains between Kim Tjoan and his neighbors, but in an exaggerated form.
When Nurcholish Madjid was accused of having been influenced by orientalists it 
meant that what he said, whether he knew it or not, originated in the distortions of 
Jews from another place and time. His errors were not a matter of his intentions, thus 
his pronouncements were not correctable. What he said was not a matter of 
interpretation. It was rather a question of finding the distant factors that compelled his
59 Aru, "Membongkar Jaringan Kristenisasi, Yahudi dan Cina Anti Islam" ("Demolishing the Network of 
Christianization, Jews and Anti-Islamic Chinese"), Media Dakwah, March 1997, p. 41.
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speech. Resting outside interpretation, Nurcholish's message was not understandable. 
One can say that it was singular even if it was recognizable as the type of something 
that others, such as the Egyptian Thaha Husein, had said before. It was, in that sense, 
mere repetition of the same. Its singularity, pointing to an impossible source of 
(un)truth, was the possibility of any message whatsoever. Mistranslations might even 
foretell the messiah in the form of Buki.
The Jewish uncanny in Indonesia comes with the erosion of the national idea and 
the consequent feeling that "Indonesians" now have different sources of truth. The Jew 
appears—though that is not the correct verb . . . "reaches" would be more apt—not 
only from outside Indonesia, but from outside the history of Indonesia, helping to 
make him unapparent. He acts from out of nowhere. He is not a revenant, the French 
term which indicates a ghost as something that returns. To be such, he would, of 
course, have to be identifiable and to actually appear. As it is, each time there is a 
Jewish effect felt, it is mere repetition of something that comes from no knowable 
origin and bears no form. The uncanny effect of Jews is thus different from that of the 
"Chinese." "Chinese" are a recurrent, indeed constant feature of Indonesian society. 
Chinese give the uncanny a body. Jews inhabit nothing in Indonesia. The word "Jew" 
in Indonesian indicates a menace. No form has been found for it. Jews are not specters, 
but the threat of specters to come. "Chinese" give the Jewish threat of the coming of 
ghosts a body and thus a place in Indonesia.60
Buki is as close as I can find to a Jewish specter in Indonesia, though he is not that. 
If we are permitted to imagine the effects of a confrontation between him and his 
Muslim neighbors, what can we suppose they would find? In the thinking of Media 
Dakioah, Buki, were he present to do so, would embody the singular messages of 
orientalists. Were he capable of being present, one would see without knowing exactly 
what one was facing, the effects of Koranic teachings twisted out of recognition long 
ago somewhere else. Facing him, even in his absence, certain Indonesians Muslims 
find themselves no longer at home in their own land, and this feeling of alienation is 
even more thorough than when they confront "Chinese."
Buki had his own teachings, uninfluenced by Jews. One can imagine that they were 
unique and that they 'contained a political program. Does his banishment then indicate 
the failure of the idea of the rakyatl That is, is it a failure of the possibility of becoming 
other that occurred when the nation was newborn, when a peasant listened to Sukarno 
speak and found himself to be one of the people, his origin inconsequential? If, after 
Buki spoke, some of the people of Tasikmalaya found in his message what they 
seemed to think, as others did when they heard Sukarno, one could say that this 
possibility of becoming other—of becoming Indonesian in fellowship with all other 
Indonesians—is still alive. Buki, the individual, is gone. "Chinese" remain. Alas, they 
remain to embody the failure of that possibility. As such, they, amongst other figures, 
are established as Indonesian national ghosts, supplementing the numerous local 
spirits that inhabit the regions of Java.
60 Another effect of the feeling of undefined menace perhaps is the prominence of the word "trauma" in 
latter New Order discourse. The feeling, new to Indonesia, of an incurable wound, caused by a continuing 
menace which often has no certain origins, occurs alongside the new upsurgence of anti-Semitism. Here 
too one might think of it as an attempt to place the effects of the Jew within Indonesian society. Cf. James 
T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), Chapter 4.
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It is not altogether surprising to find anti-Semitism without Jews; after all, it is not 
caused by Jews.61 It is not surprising that Indonesian Muslims identify themselves with 
their coreligionists in the Middle East. It is striking, however, when so many 
Indonesians conflate Zionists and Jews and when this conflation inflects their self 
image or, rather, lack of one, and comes to mark the limit of national identity.
61 Martin van Bruinessen rightly points out that anti-Semitism is often found in places in Europe and 
America where Jews are rare. The difference with Indonesia, however, is that such places as rural North 
Dakota still belong to larger societies where Jews play a part and where the terms of their recognition are 
widely circulated. See Martin van Bruinessen, "Yahudi sebagai Simbol Dalam Wacana Pemikiran Islam 
Indonesia Masa Kini," p. 259. Other Asian cases of anti-Semitism, quite different in their configurations 
from Indonesia's, are Japan and China. See the relevant articles in Frank Dikotter, The Construction of Racial 
Identities in China and Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997) as well as David Goodman and 
Masanori Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
